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Abstract. This article describes psychological phenomena that can easily subvert personnel security 
standards in government, the military, and business.  
 
The recent disclosure of a classified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspector's General report on 
security violations of Mr. John Deutch, a former CIA director, highlights psychological phenomena that 
can easily subvert the most carefully crafted personnel security standards. (The following analysis is 
based solely on descriptions of the report from The New York Times.)  
 
First, Mr. Deutch may have decided not to have computer support (that could more safely handle 
classified information) installed at his private residence. As well, he may have decided not to have CIA 
security officers assigned to his home. Both decisions seem suspect given that Mr. Deutch was filling a 
position that requires "being on-call" 24 hours per day and that requires quick access to classified 
information. The decisions could suggest a naiveté about his position: believing that he would not be 
working with classified information at home. The decisions also could suggest a sense of entitlement 
that he did not have to follow appropriate security procedures or experience the inevitable 
inconveniences of following such procedures. (Both senses of entitlement could be associated with the 
positive work ethic--that classified work would occur day and might as necessary.) As well, the decisions 
could suggest that he was intentionally planning to misuse classified information for espionage or other 
purposes.  
 
Second, Mr. Deutch may have decided to engage in highly sensitive work at home as opposed to 
headquarters so that other CIA officials would not see what he was writing. This decision could suggest 
that his work was too "high-quality" and did not need to be vetted by others, that his work was too 
controversial to be shared with others who might then seek to sabotage it, that his work was "not up to 
snuff" and could not stand up to vetting, and that his work was geared towards hurting CIA and the 
United States (US).  
 
Third, Mr. Deutch--after he announced that he was resigning from CIA--may have decided to keep his 
CIA-obtained unclassifed computers. He may have decided this because he was using them for his 
personal banking. And he may have decided to legitimize keeping the computers by setting up a no-fee 
consulting contract with CIA--a contract that may have had little to do with any actual consulting or that 
may have had to with consulting that would not require the computers in question. These decisions not 
only suggest both types of senses of entitlement described above but seem to explicitly relate to 
violating policies on legitimate uses of federal government property and the intent of consulting 
relationships with the federal government. And again, the decisions would facilitate activities related to 
these computers that might intentionally harm CIA and the US.  
 
Fourth, Mr. Deutch may have decided to access the Internet with his unclassified computers through 
unsecured services such as America Online--thus vastly increasing the vulnerability of classified 
information on his computers to others. Again, there are suggestions of senses of entitlement, apparent 
ignorance (since Deutch is quoted as stating that he "never considered the information on his home 
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computers to be at risk"), violations of federal government policy (the work-relatedness of Internet 
access), and intent to harm the CIA and the US.  
 
Fifth, Mr. Deutch may have decided to delete over 1,000 files from his computers--after he had been 
visited by a CIA computer security specialist. He also may have refused to be interviewed by CIA security 
staff--but eventually allowed one security staffer to review all the computer files at his (Mr. Deutch's 
home.) Again, there are suggestions of senses of entitlement, policy and even criminal violations (e.g., 
obstruction of justice), and intent to harm CIA and the US.  
 
Compared to Mr. Wen Ho Lee, the former Los Alamos National Laboratory computer scientist accused of 
gross mishandling of classified information, Mr. Deutch had access to a greater breadth and depth of 
sensitive information. Moreover, Mr. Deutch had a political system of enablers that apparently 
facilitated mishandling of classified information and impeded a timely and comprehensive investigation 
into actual and alleged mishandling. Yet, Mr. Lee is being held without bail and is awaiting trial, while 
Mr. Deutch is not. Why? Some US Government (USG) officials claim that Mr. Lee had an intent to aid a 
foreign country, while Mr. Deutch did not--even though the latter may have been electronically 
contacted at home by at least one Russian scientist.  
 
This demarcation of intent that would support such radically differential treatment has not been publicly 
supported by reasonably convincing data. While concerns to protect intelligence sources, methods, 
findings, and the viability of a successful prosec ution might support this position, an epiphenomenal 
degradation of personnel security compliance and the rule of law throughout the Intelligence 
Community might merit a reevaluation of disparate impact. (See Akhtar, S.S., Khan, A., & Ansari, S.A. 
(1989) . Perceived need deficiency among government officers. Journal of Personality and Clinical 
Studies, 5, 115-120; Brown, A.D. (1997). Narcissism, identity, and legitimacy. Academy of Management 
Review, 22, 643-686; Inwald, R.E., & Brockwe ll, A.L. (1991). Predicting the performance of government 
security personnel with the IPI and MMPI. Journal of Personality Assessment, 56, 522-535; Moses, R.,& 
Moses-Hrushovski, R. (1990). Reflections on the sense of entitlement. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 
45, 61-78; Risen, J. (February 1, 2000). C.I.A. inquiry of its ex-director was stalled at top, report says. The 
New York Times, p. A1; A16.) (Keywords: Counterintelligence, John Deutch, Espionage, Wen Ho Lee, 
Personnel Security.) 
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